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STEPPING FORWARD OR STUMBLING BACK?
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILURE
TO ACT, CIVILIAN SUPERIORS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
DANIEL WATT†
The application of the doctrine of command responsibility (“CR”) to civilian
leaders is unsettled under international law. Jurisprudence which has applied
CR to civilian leaders has been inconsistent, unprincipled and potentially
unjust. International decisions such as the Celebici case at the ICTY suggest
that CR can theoretically apply to civilians, but the subsequent Kordic decision
indicates that international jurists are extremely wary of extending CR to
civilian leaders. The Rome Statute of the nascent International Criminal Court
is the first codified international law that explicitly provides for individual
criminal liability for civilians on the basis of CR. This paper argues that, given
the unsettled status of civilian CR under customary international law, the
Rome Statute is an improvement for the mere fact that it explicitly provides CR
for civilians. As such, criticisms that the ICC provisions weaken the doctrine
in relation to civilian leaders are incorrect because they misconstrue the status
quo under international custom. It is not settled under international law
whether and to what extent command responsibility even applies to civilians.
Moreover, in the few cases in which command responsibility has been used to
hold civilians responsible for international crimes, the doctrine has resulted in
injustice. As such, the explicit codification of the doctrine in relation to civilians
is an improvement on, rather than a regression of, the status quo of CR.

Daniel Watt will complete the requirements for an LL.B. from Dalhousie University in
2008, and will be articling at McInnes Cooper in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
†
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I. INTRODUCTION

The international law doctrine of command responsibility (“CR”) has generated
controversy since at least 1946, when Japanese General Yamashita was executed
for war crimes committed in the Philippines by soldiers under his command.1
Traditionally, CR imposes individual liability on military commanders for
failure to prevent or punish unlawful acts committed by subordinates.2 In
the decades between 1946 and the early 1990s, CR essentially arose only with
regard to the 1968 massacre of civilians by U.S. soldiers in My Lai, Vietnam,
and the pogroms by Phalangist militia in Israeli-controlled refugee camps in
Lebanon in 1982.3, With the creation of the International Criminal Tribunals
for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in the 1990s, CR
gained new importance. The doctrine is no less relevant today. Questions of
individual liability for violations of international humanitarian law (“IHL”)4
are bound to arise as states struggle to redefine that body of law in the novel
and complex context of international terrorism. With the legal rules in a state
of in flux, torture and other violations of IHL appear to be becoming all too
common occurrences in the global war on terror.5
The application of CR to military commanders is generally settled at
international law. Much more controversial is the application of CR to nonmilitary superiors, such as civilian political leaders. International decisions
on this issue are sparse, and often questionable in their reasoning. There
Major William H. Parks, “Command Responsibility for War Crimes” (1973) 62 Mil. L.
Rev. 1 at 2, 22-23 [Parks]; see also In re Yamashita (1945) 1 327 U.S. 1 [Yamashita].
2
Ibid.
3
Weston Burnett, “Command Responsibility and a Case Study of the Criminal
Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra” (1985)
107 Mil. L. Rev. 71 at 72-76; William Fenrick, “Some International Law Problems Related
to Prosecutions before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia”
(1995-1996) 6 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l. L. 103, at 118, 120 [Fenrick, “ICTY Problems”].
4
This term refers to the body of law which governs situations of armed conflict,
sometimes called the laws of war or law of armed conflict.
5
See generally Jordan Paust, “Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International
Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees” (2004-2005) 43 Colum. J.
Transnat’l L. 811.
1
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has also been scant comment by international legal scholars. As such, the
question of whether and how CR applies to civilian superiors is unclear.
Yet, CR offers a potentially powerful basis for holding civilian superiors to
account for violations of IHL. Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda’s
conviction at the ICTR illustrates that war criminals often wear business
suits rather than military fatigues.6
Given the unsettled status quo, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”)7, which codifies distinct CR provisions for military commanders
and civilian superiors in its Article 28, is an improvement on the existing
customary international law of CR. There has been little academic discussion
of Article 28. The most detailed analysis of Article 28, by commentator Greg
Vetter, criticises the provision for “weaken[ing] the reach of the doctrine
for civilian superiors” by holding civilians to a lower standard in relation to
military commanders.8 Relying on the “contemporary authority”9 on CR,
the Celebici decision of the ICTY,10 Vetter argues that the ICC’s “bifurcated”
approach regresses from past IHL jurisprudence, which has on occasion
convicted civilian superiors on the basis of command responsibility.11
This paper is a response to Vetter’s criticisms.12 It will show that Vetter’s
critique is well-intentioned, but are based on a misreading of customary
Prosecutor v. Kambanda (1998), ICTR-97-23-S (International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Trial Chamber) (Kambanda was convicted on a guilty plea, and sentenced to
life imprisonment; he appealed, essentially trying to withdraw the plea. His claim was
dismissed: Kambanda v. Prosecutor (2000), ICTR-97-23-A (ICTR, Appeal Chamber)).
7
17 July 1998, Can. T.S. 2002 No.13, art.28 (entered into force in Canada 1 July 2002)
[Rome Statute].
8
Greg Vetter, “Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International
Criminal Court (ICC)” (2000) 25 Yale J. Int’l. L. J. 89 at 93-94, 126, 141[Vetter].
9 Alexander Zahar, “Command Responsibility of Civilian Superiors for Genocide” (2001)
14 Leiden. J. Int’l. L. 591 at 592 [Zahar].
10
Prosecutor v. Delalic et al. (1996) Case No. IT-96-21-T (ICTY, Trial Chamber) [Celebici].
11
Vetter, supra note 8 at 95.
12
There is very little academic discussion specifically addressing the issue of CR for
civilians in the context of the Article 28 of the Rome Statute. While some commentators
and jurisprudence rely on the post-WWII and ICTY/ICTR jurisprudence to assert that
customary CR applies to civilians (see generally Lippmann, infra; Celebici, supra). Vetter
explicitly uses such reasoning to critique the ICC provisions as a regression from the
customary state of the law. Responding to Vetter’s criticism is thus important, as a codified
CR provision for civilians is a new—and in this author’s opinion—welcome development.
6
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international law. Celebici certainly suggests that CR can be applied to civilian
superiors. Vetter, however, is overly optimistic about the scope of Celebici.
In the light of the later Kordic decision,13 it is doubtful whether courts will
ever actually apply Celebici to hold civilian superiors to account. Vetter’s
criticisms of the Rome Statute rely blithely on questionable and inconsistent
precedents from the post-World War II Tokyo Trial14 and the ICTR.15 Given
the unsatisfactory and unsettled state of CR at customary international law,
this paper argues that Article 28 of the Rome Statute is not a regression.
Rather, it codifies a clear standard in an area of IHL that has historically
been applied inconsistently and possibly, unjustly.
In Part II CR will be described and distinguished from related concepts,
which also provides an outline of the fundamental rationale and theoretical
justification for the doctrine. After briefly distinguishing between two main
sources of IHL, several specific legal sources of CR are outlined. Part III
concludes with an examination of the contested CR provisions of the Rome
Statute. In Part IV the main argument is drawn out, showing that certain
examples of past international decisions applying CR to civilians are poorly
reasoned, do not accord with the doctrine’s fundamental justifications, and
weaken the practical effect of Celebici.

Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez (2001), Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (ICTY, Trial Chamber)
[Kordic].
14
Matthew Lippman, “Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command
Responsibility” (2001) 8 Tul. J. Comp. & Int’l. L. 1 at 22-24 [Lippman].
15
Prosecutor v. Musema (2000), Case No. ICTR-96-13-T (ICTR, Trial Chamber I)
[Musema]; Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana (1999), Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (ICTR,
Trial Chamber II); see also Zahar, supra note 9 at 592.
13
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II. DEFINING THE DOCTRINE
A. Command Responsibility for Failure to Act
There are two related and overlapping forms of CR which should be
distinguished. The first is “direct” CR, whereby criminal liability arises when
a commander orders his or her subordinates to commit unlawful acts.16
Direct CR is a separate mode of liability for what could broadly be termed
‘direct participation’ in the offence, which includes ‘ordering’ and ‘planning’
offences. Article 7(1) of the ICTY’s constating statute (“ICTY Statute”), for
instance, provides for direct CR as follows:17
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation
or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the
crime.
Article 6 of the ICTR’s statute (“ICTR Statute”)18 mirrors article 7(1) of the
ICTY Statute. The Rome Statute similarly provides for direct CR in article
25(3)(b), which imposes individual CR where the accused person “orders,
solicits or induces the commission of such a crime”.19
However, the debate surrounding the Rome Statute hinges on “indirect” CR,
or CR “stricto sensu”.20 This form of the doctrine, which is the focus of this
Celebici, supra note 10 ¶ 333.
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, SC Res. 827, UN SCOR, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [ICTY
Statute].
18
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such
Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, Between 1 January 1994
and 31 December 1994, SC Res. 955, UN SCOR, 1994, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [ICTR
Statute].
19
Rome Statute, supra note 7 art. 25(3)(b).
20
Celebici, supra note 10 ¶ 333-334.
16
17
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paper, is termed more precisely as “command responsibility for failure to
act.”21 As Bill Fenrick points out, it is this more controversial variety with
which IHL specialists have been primarily concerned.22 In this form, CR
imposes criminal liability on superiors for failing to prevent or punish the
international crimes of subordinates. As I discuss further in Part III, indirect
CR is provided for by article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute,23 article 6(3) of the
ICTR Statute24 and article 28 of the Rome Statute.25
B. The Rationale for Command Responsibility
CR for failure to act is a mode of liability whereby, under certain conditions,
individual criminal liability will be imputed to a superior for unlawful
acts committed by his or her subordinates.26 Traditionally, CR has applied
primarily to military commanders.27 The doctrine is designed to deter the
unchecked violence which can so quickly erupt during armed conflict.
Under the threat of individual criminal liability, commanders have incentive
to keep a tight rein on the conduct of subordinates. As Matthew Lippman
notes: 28
The imposition of criminal culpability is intended to
create an incentive to insure that subordinates abide by
the humanitarian law of war. This extension of liability is
necessitated by the lethal consequences resulting from the
contravention of the code of conflict.

This is a term used by Bill Fenrick in his course in International Humanitarian Law at
Dalhousie University (2007); see generally Celebici, supra note 10 ¶ 338; William Fenrick,
“Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” (1995-1996) 6 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l. L. 103,
at 110 [Fenrick, “ICTY Problems”].
22
Fenrick “ICTY Problems”, supra note 3 at 110.
23
ICTY Statute, supra note 17 art. 7(3).
24
ICTR Statute, supra note 18 art. 6(3).
25
Rome Statute, supra note 7 art. 28.
26
Parks, supra note 1 at 20; Celebici, supra note 10 ¶ 333-334; Lippman, supra note 14 at 1.
27
See Parks supra note 1; Fenrick “ICTY Problems”, supra note 3 at 110; Burnett, supra
note 3 at 76.
28
Lippmann, supra note 14 at 1.
21
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In addition to its deterrent value, CR imposes an additional mode of
liability, beyond direct participation, on those responsible for violations
of IHL. As Vetter suggests, “the doctrine of command responsibility
has been an important tool to hold accountable leaders who plan,
participate in, or acquiesce in large-scale human rights abuses.” 29 The
practical effect for prosecutors, and accused superiors in the dock, is
that CR provides an alternative argument for liability; in the event the
accused is acquitted of ordering a breach of IHL, the accused may still
be held liable for failing to prevent or punish the breach. 30 The ICTY
indictment of Tihomir Blaskic illustrates the additional prosecutorial
scope provided by CR:31
From May 1992 to January 1994 Tihomir BLASKIC,
together with members of the HVO, planned, instigated,
ordered, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation, or execution of a crime against humanity by
persecuting Bosnian Muslim civilians on political, racial,
or religious grounds […]
and, or in the alternative, knew or had reason to know that
subordinates were about to do the same, or had done so,
and failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
CR, therefore, provides both deterrent and procedural benefits. It deters
violations by threatening punishment for failure to control subordinates.
It also expands the basis on which superiors can be held liable. As such,
CR is useful for preventing deterring war crimes and punishing those who
orchestrate them.
Nevertheless, the other side of the coin is – or should be – concerned with
fairness and rights of the accused. CR has great potential for delivering
Vetter, supra note 8, at 92.
William J. Fenrick, The Prosecution of Unlawful Attack Cases before the ICTY (2004) 7
Y.B. Int’l. Human. L. 153, at 177-178 [Fenrick, “ICTY Prosecution].
31
Prosecutor v. Blaskic (2000), Case No. IT-95-14 (ICTY, Trial Chamber I) (Second
Amended Indictment).
29
30
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justice. Yet, as will be shown, if improperly applied, it has commensurate
potential for injustice.
C. Basis for Liability under CR
CR imposes criminal liability on commanders for crimes which they did not
directly commit. By punishing one person for the acts of another, CR can
be fraught with moral and legal pitfalls. The underlying justification for the
“potential harshness” of the doctrine is the recognition of the commander’s
legal “duty to control the conduct of his subordinates, insuring their
compliance with the law of war.”32 As Celebici holds:33
[CR] is best understood when seen against the principle
that criminal responsibility for omissions is incurred only
where there exists a legal obligation to act… [I]nternational
law imposes an affirmative duty on superiors to prevent
persons under their control from committing violations
of [IHL], and it is ultimately this duty that provides the
basis for, and defines the contours of, the imputed criminal
responsibility…
The imposition of criminal liability on a commander for failure to prevent or
punish crimes committed by subordinates thus requires that the commander
was under a positive duty to do so. This principle is “reasonable and fair,”
and in accordance with general principles of criminal justice.34 If civilian
superiors are to be held accountable on the basis of CR, they must also be
under such a duty.
The duty imposed on military commanders does not arise simply because
they don a uniform. It cannot be the case that every superior becomes
criminally liable for the unlawful acts of every rank and file soldier. Rather,
the duty arises because of the “control” a commander exerts over the conduct
Parks, supra note 1 at 20, 35.
Celebici, supra note 10 ¶ 334.
34
Arthur Thomas O`Reilly, “Command Responsibility: A Call to Realign Doctrine with
Principles” (2004-2005) 20 Am. U. Int’l. L. Rev. 71 at 98.
32
33
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of subordinates.35 Lippman notes that CR presumes that “military officers
and civilian officials possess the knowledge, authority and power to curb the
transgressions of their troops.”36 Presaging Celebici, Lieutenant Commander
Burnett puts it best, stating that CR “hinges to a great extent, on the degree
of effective control actually wielded by the commander over the detailed
activities of his subordinates.”37 In the absence of actual control, therefore,
the basis for imposing the legal duty breaks down.
CR is traditionally a military doctrine, with roots going back millennia.38
The archetypical strict military command structure suggests that soldiers
obediently carry out superior orders without question or hesitation. Where
subordinates commit atrocities, one presumes that either they were ordered
to do so, or that their superior has lost control over their conduct. The same
presumption of control, however, does not arise as readily with respect
to civilian superiors. Indeed, given the less centralised nature of modern
military command structures, control can no longer be safely presumed
even in the case of military commanders.39 This highlights the key issue of
whether the legal duty to control subordinates can properly be imposed on
civilian leaders. The question is, under what circumstances, and to what
extent, can civilian leaders be expected to control those “on the ground”
who directly violate IHL? Jurisprudence on this issue, as I show below, does
not answer this issue satisfactorily.

35
36
37
38
39

Parks, supra note 1 at 35, 63, 65.
Lippman, supra note 14 at 90.
Burnett, supra note 3 at 76.
Parks, supra note 1, at 3.
Burnett, supra note 3 at 76.
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III. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SOURCES OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
A. Sources of IHL
IHL, like all international law, arises from two main sources: conventional
international law, such as treaties and conventions; and customary international
law.40 Customary international law arises from state practice, and requires that
there is “a consistent and general international practice among states, and [that] the
practice [is] accepted as law by the international community.41 This latter element
is termed opinio juris.42 The significance of customary law is that it is binding on
all states, unless a particular state has “consistently and unequivocally [refused]
to accept a custom in the process of formation.”43 Conventional international law,
by contrast, binds only those states which have signed and ratified a particular
agreement.44 However, conventional law can pass into customary international
law.45 For example, Roberts and Guelff suggest that the Geneva Conventions46
and the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land47 have over time emerged as customary international law.48
See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, art.
38 (entered into force in Canada 24 October 1945), cited in Hugh M. Kindred et al., eds.,
International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada , 7th ed. (Toronto: Emonds
Montgomery Publications, 2006), at 107.
41
Kindred et al., ibid. at 148.
42
Ibid..
43
Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, eds., Documents of the Laws of War, 3rd ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003) at 7.
44
Kindred et al., supra note 40 at 113.
45
Roberts & Guelff, supra note 43 at 7-8.
46
Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field [Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention II for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea [Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention II Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War [Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Treatment of
Civilian Persons in Time of War [Geneva Convention IV]. All the aforementioned signed
12 August 1949, Can. T.S. 1965 No. 20 (entered into force 21 October 1950, entered into
force in Canada 14 May 1965).
47
18 October 1907, [treaty series] (entered into force 26 January 1910) [Hague Convention
IV], cited in Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflict (Leiden &
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) at 55-87.
48
Roberts & Guelff, supra note 43 at 8.
40
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B. Early International Instruments: Hague Convention IV
In 1907, the Hague Convention IV and its Hague Regulations49 became the
first international instrument to codify a form of CR.50 The Hague Convention
IV allowed for state liability rather than individual criminal liability.51 The
Hague Regulations require that, in order to qualify as a lawful belligerent,
the party’s armed force must be “commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates.”52 In the context of the development of CR, the Hague
Convention IV “is a manifestation and codification of that which was custom
among the signatory nations, giving early recognition to the duties and
responsibilities of the commander.”53
The Hague Convention IV therefore codified the general notion that
commanders are responsible for their subordinates. It did not, however,
impose individual criminal liability on commanders for breaches of the laws
of war committed by their subordinates. Such liability did not arise until
after the Second World War.
C. The Second World War Trials and CR as Custom
The aftermath of the Second World War established a number of crucial
precedents with respect to CR. It is partly this foundation upon which
Vetter relies to assert that Article 28 is a regression from the scope of CR as
it exists as customary international law. This section attempts to show that
the customary foundation for CR does not go so far as Vetter suggests. The
impact of the Yamashita decision, two key Nuremberg decisions and the
Tokyo Trials are briefly summarised here.
The customary international law foundation for CR was the 1945 prosecution
of General Yamashita, commander of Japanese forces in the Philippines, and
military governor of the Philippines, before an American military commission
Annex to the Convention (IV): Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, 18 October 1907, [Treaty Series] [Hague Regulations].
50
Parks, supra note 1 at 10-11; L.C. Green, “Command Responsibility in International
Humanitarian Law” (1995) 5 Transnat’l. L. & Contemp. Probs. 319 at 325 [Green, “CR”]]
51
Hague Convention IV, supra note 46 art. 3.
52
Parks, supra note 1 at 10-11, citing Hague Regulations, art. 1.
53
Ibid, at 11.
49
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consisting of lay members.54 Yamashita was convicted of war crimes committed
by his troops.55 Yamashita’s significance with respect to CR stems from his
petition for habeas corpus to the United States Supreme Court.56 In dismissing
the petition, the Court held that international law imposed “an affirmative
duty to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate in the
circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population.”57
Some have mistakenly interpreted Yamashita as imposing a “strict liability”
standard, whereby knowledge of subordinates’ crimes is presumed from
a position of command and widespread occurrence of crimes.58 This
interpretation has been firmly rejected by subsequent jurisprudence and
commentary.59 What it did establish was that CR imposed individual criminal
liability on military commanders for failure to control their subordinates.
Yamashita thus provided a basis for subsequent international trials.
The Nuremberg Trial was created in 1945.60 The most important CR
precedents are the High Command 61 and Hostages62 cases.63 High Command
involved 14 high-ranking German officers.64 Most of the charges related to
illegal conduct committed by soldiers and the issuance and transmission of
illegal orders.65 The decision defined the parameters of the commanders’ duty
Ibid, note 1 at 37; Burnett, supra note 3 at 87.
Parks, ibid. at 22, 37, 64.
56
Yamashita, supra note 1.
57
Ibid.
58
Vetter, supra note 8 at 107-108; Lippman, supra note 14 at 14.
59
Burnett, supra note 3 at 92-94, 98; Parks, supra note 1 at 31; Celebici, supra note 10 ¶
384-386; William Hays Parks, “A Few Tools in the Prosecution of War Crimes” (1995) 149
Mil. L. Rev. 73, at 74 [Parks, “A Few Tools”].
60
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, 8 August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 (entered into force 8 August 1945) [London
Agreement].
61
U.S. v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al., UN War Crimes Commission, 12 Law Reports of Trials of
War Criminals 23 (1948) [High Command], cited in Burnett, supra note 3 at 88, note 114.
62
U.S. v. Wilhelm List et al., UN War Crimes Commission, 8 Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals 34 (1948) [Hostages], cited in Burnett, supra note 3 at 99, note 113.
63 Parks, supra note 1; Burnett, supra note 3; Lippman, supra note 14; Green, “CR”, supra
note 53.
64
Burnett, supra note 3 at 88.
65
Ibid, at 99.
54
55
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confirmed in Yamashita.66 The “standard of responsibility” was interpreted
as “a breach of some moral obligation, fixed by international law, a personal
act voluntarily done with knowledge of its inherent criminality under
international law.”67 Any strict liability theory was rejected.68 Participation
or even “acquiescence” in the transmission of illegal orders would attract
liability.69 Superior orders were rejected as a defence, but might mitigate
punishment.70 Liability required more than the mere existence of a superiorsubordinate relationship.71 Instead, crimes must be “directly traceable” to
the commander, or the failure to supervise subordinates must constitute
“criminal negligence.”72 The threshold was “a wanton, immoral disregard
of the action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence.”73 Any other
standard “would go far beyond the basic principles of criminal law as known
to civilized nations.”74
Hostages involved 12 generals accused of war crimes committed in countries
occupied by Germany.75 The accused were charged for “the murder and
deportation of thousands of persons” on their orders.76 The main CR issue
was whether commanders could be liable for troops over which they do not
exercise operational control.77 Hostages distinguished between commanders
with tactical control, and those charged with administering an occupied
territory. Those exercising “tactical command” were responsible only for
the acts of troops over which they had operational control.78 Commanders
in control of an occupied area, however, had a broader responsibility.79 The
Tribunal imposed more expansive CR on such commanders based on the
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Parks, supra note 1 at 63.
Ibid. at 40, citing High Command.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 41-42.
Ibid. at 42.
Ibid. at 43.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Burnett, supra note 3 at 109.
Parks, supra note 1 at 58.
Ibid. at 60.
Burnett, supra note 3, at 110.
Burnett, supra note 3, at 110.
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international legal obligation of those charged with administering occupied
territory.80
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (“Tokyo Trial”) was
established in 1946.81 28 Japanese officers and civilian Cabinet ministers were
charged with international crimes spanning decades,82 including the 1937
Rape of Nanking.83 The charges alleged on the basis of CR dealt mainly with
“the mistreatment and security of prisoners of war.”84 The Tokyo Trial’s main
significance with regard to CR is two-fold. First, the Tribunal held civilian
political leaders liable on the basis of CR. This issue will be dealt with further
below. This section addresses the second main significance, its discussion of
CR for military commanders.
The Tribunal found that customary law imposed a duty to prevent
mistreatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees.85 This duty was
imposed on the responsible government members and military officers.86
Superiors had to prevent mistreatment by “establishing and securing a
continuous and efficient working system.”87 If this duty was met, but war
crimes were nevertheless committed, superiors could be held responsible on
two bases. First, they would be liable if they knew of the crimes and “failed
to take such steps as were within their power to prevent the commission of
See Leslie Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 2nd ed. (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2000), at 303, note 110 [Green, “LOAC”]; Parks, supra note 1
at 256-267; Burnett, supra note 3 at 112.
81
General Douglas MacArthur, United States Army, General Orders No. 1, Special
Proclamation: Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East (signed
in Tokyo, 19 January 1946), as am’d by General Order No. 20;Charter of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (signed in Tokyo, 19 January 1946) [Tokyo Trial
Charter], reprinted in R. John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide, eds., The Tokyo War
Crimes Trial, v. 1 (New York & London: Garland Publishing Inc.,1981).
82
See Pritchard & Zaide, ibid, “Indictment”, Group One, Count 1.
83
Parks, supra note 1 at 68.
84
Lippman, supra note 14 at 17; Pritchard & Zaide, supra note 85, at “Indictment”, Group
Three, Counts 53-55; Burnett, supra note 3 at 115.
85 Volume 200, Official Transcript of the International Japanese War Crimes Trials in the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, at 48 442 to 48 447 [Transcript].
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.
80
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such crimes in the future.”88 Second, criminal negligence would arise if they
“failed to acquire such knowledge.”89
In sum, the post-World War II decisions recognised that, as a matter
of customary international law, a commander has “a duty to supervise
and control the conduct of his subordinates in accordance with existing
principles of the law of war.”90 The distinctions drawn between officers with
little operational control over subordinates and those with broad authority
suggest that the standard of CR is commensurate to the commander’s actual
power to control his or her subordinates. Yamashita provided the basis
that a failure to prevent or punish violations imposes individual criminal
responsibility on commanders, even before international tribunals.91 With
regard to the required elements of CR, liability arises where commanders
intentionally transmit or give illegal orders. Moreover, commanders can be
held liable if their failure to ascertain the illegal nature of the orders, or failure
to sufficiently supervise the conduct of their troops, amounted to criminal
negligence. High Command suggests that this will be a high threshold.92 The
principle of strict liability was rejected in all cases. The defence of superior
orders was also rejected, although it might be a mitigating factor in imposing
punishment. Thus CR emerged as a doctrine of customary international law.
D. Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions93
In 1977, the first CR doctrine, in the sense of imposing individual criminal
liability on commanders, was codified in an international agreement.94
Article 86(1) of AP I provides that states parties “shall repress grave
breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches,
of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result from failure to act
Ibid.
Ibid.
90
Parks, supra note 1, at 77.
91
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when under a duty to do so.”95 Article 86(2) codifies the CR standard,
stating:96
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this
Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve
his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as
the case may be, if they knew, or had information which
should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances
at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit
such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures
with their power to prevent or repress the breach.
As Green points out, this provision “confirms that a commander is responsible
if he fails to prevent or repress a breach committed by a subordinate.”97
Articles 87(1) and (3) codify the military commander’s duty to prevent or
punish breaches of the Geneva Conventions or AP I committed by persons
under his or her control. It states that:
[Parties] shall require military commanders, with respect
to members of their armed forces under their command
and other persons under their control, to prevent, and
where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent
authorities breaches of the Conventions and this Protocol.
[Parties] shall require any commander who is aware that
subordinates or other persons under his control are going
to commit or have committed a breach of the Conventions
or this Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary
to prevent such violations…, and, where appropriate,
to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators
thereof.
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The effect of AP I was to codify a form of CR in conventional international
law. Superiors are not absolved of responsibility simply because subordinates
violated the Geneva Conventions or AP I. The duty to prevent and punish
violations of the treaties is imposed on military commanders who are “aware”
that those under their control have committed or are about to commit
violations.98 The mental standard of “aware” remains undefined by AP I.99
However, article 86(2) provides a “specific and detailed mental standard,”
namely that the commander “knew, or had information which should have
enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time” that a breach had
occurred or would occur.100 The latter mental element of “had information”
is similar to the standard evinced in Hostages. It thus appears to preclude the
commander being ‘wilfully blind’ or criminally negligent by failing to make
inquiries when put on notice of possible breaches.
Two final points should be made regarding AP I. The first is that the treaty
only applies to “international armed conflict” involving parties to the Geneva
Conventions and AP I.101 The CR provisions are thus inapplicable in internal
disturbances. The second point is that AP I does not refer explicitly to civilian
superiors. While it could be argued that the use of the term “superiors” in
article 86(2) is broad enough to include civilians, it is ambiguous at best.
Moreover, the exclusive use of the terms “military commanders” and
“commanders” in the text and heading of article 87 suggests that it applies
solely to military commanders. Parks suggests otherwise, asserting that this
provision includes civilians in the “command and control chain,” such as the
U.S. President, who is Commander-in-Chief of American armed forces.102
This is undoubtedly so. However, Parks does not suggest that civilians
outside the formal chain of command and control structure, without de jure
legal authority, would be included as “commanders.” As such, AP I provides
little clarity regarding the problem of civilian CR.
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E. The ICTR and ICTY Statutes
No major developments in CR emerged until the establishment of the ICTR
and ICTY in the 1990s. The ICTR and ICTY statutes contain identical
codified CR provisions. Thus, only the ICTY need be discussed here. Article
7(3) and (4) state as follows:103
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of
the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does
not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew
or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to
commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order
of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him of
criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation
of punishment if the International Tribunal determines
that justice so requires.
In a manner resembling High Command, article 7(4) provides that the
defence of superior orders will not prevent a finding of liability, but may
be considered to mitigate punishment. Article 7(3) provides the basis for
CR before the ICTY. Several points can be made about this standard. First,
the mental standard “is couched in standard legal terminology,” including
both actual knowledge (“knew”), and constructive knowledge (“had reason
to know”).104 Second, the provision imposes the duty to prevent or to punish
perpetrators. Third, the duty will be satisfied by necessary and reasonable
measures, a “more objective” standard than that in AP I.105 Finally, the term
“superior” is undefined, thus leaving it open to interpretation as to whether
CR applies to civilians. The ICTY’s interpretation of this provision will be
discussed below.
ICTY Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(3), (4); ICTR Statute, supra note 18, art. 6(3), (4).
Ann B. Ching, “Evolution of the Command Responsibility Doctrine in Light of the
Celebici Decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” (19992000) 25 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Comm. Reg. 167, at 184.
105
Ibid.
103
104

Vol. 17

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

159

F. The Rome Statute and its Critics
1. Article 28(b) - CR Applies to Civilians
The Rome Statute creating the world’s first permanent international criminal
tribunal, the ICC, came into force in 2003.106 In contrast to the ICTY, Article
28 of the Rome Statute includes a bifurcated CR provision, the heading of
which distinguishes between “commanders” and “other superiors.”107 Article
28(b) applies to a superior who is not a “military commander” or “person
effectively acting as a military commander,”108 thus creating the first codified
CR doctrine which unambiguously encompasses civilians. Article 28(a)
recreates the traditional military CR standard, in wording more detailed
than, but essentially to the same effect as, the ICTY provisions.
The more novel feature of the Rome Statute is Article 28(b), which provides
the CR standard for “other superiors”. Article 28(b) states:109
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships
not described in paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally
responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
committed by subordinates under his or her effective
authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to
exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
1. The superior either knew, or consciously
disregarded information which clearly indicated,
that the subordinates were committing or about
to commit such crimes;
2. The crimes concerned activities that were within
the effective responsibility and control of the
superior; and
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3. The superior failed to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his or her power to
prevent or repress their commission or to submit
the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.
Although the “inaction elements” in articles 28(a)(ii) and 28(b)(iii) are
substantively identical,110 there are three key differences between the
military standard in Article 28(a) and the civilian standard in Article
28(b). First, an obvious difference is that the provision distinguishes
between commanders and persons effectively acting as such on one hand
(Article 28(a)(i), and all other superior-subordinate relationships on
the other (Article 28(b)). Moreover, as Vetter suggests, Article 28(b)(ii),
which requires that “the crimes concerned activities that were within the
effective responsibility and control of the superior,” could be interpreted
as “a modification of the superior-subordinate relationship element.”111 The
second, related difference is that Article 28(b)(ii) could also be interpreted
as creating a new element, one requiring “a nexus between the criminal
activity of the subordinate and the subordinate’s activities that the superior
can control.”112 This latter interpretation, as noted below, is used by Vetter
to support his argument that the ICC provision weakens CR from its
customary state.
The final difference, and the main basis for the criticisms of the ICC civilian
standard, is that the “knowledge” element in Article 28(b)(i) requires that
the “superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which
clearly indicated” that crimes had been or were about to be committed.113 The
military standard, by contrast, requires only that the commander “knew, or
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known” of the offences.114
The significance of this difference is that the military standard appears to be
based on the straight knowledge/criminal negligence standard used in the
110
111
112
113
114
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Ibid.
Ibid.
Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 28(b)(ii).
Ibid, art. 28(a)(i) [emphasis added].

Vol. 17

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

161

post-World War II decisions, whereas the civilian standard requires that the
superior must have consciously disregarded information clearly indicating
the commission, actual or potential, of crimes.
2. Criticisms of Article 28
The main criticism Vetter levies against the CR provision of the Rome Statute
is that it “hinders the deterrent power of the doctrine” by lowering the
standard for civilians vis-à-vis military commanders.115 Vetter summarises
his essential argument:116
Historically, the military command responsibility doctrine
applied not only to military commanders, but also to
civilians. Thus, one can argue that in bifurcating the
command responsibility standard based on the type of
superior-subordinate relationship, the ICC Statute lessens
the efficacy of the permanent court because the bifurcated
structure allows a lesser knowledge standard for civilians,
that is, “consciously disregarded,” and allows the potentially
new nexus element, that is “crimes concerned activities,” to
also potentially bar liability for civilians.
Vetter thus makes two main points. First, he notes that the “consciously
disregarded” standard may be interpreted by the ICC as imposing a
CR lower standard on civilian leaders.117 If this concern materialises,
civilians will be under “a significantly lessened duty… compared to the
military commander, to remain informed of events within the superior’s
domain.”118 Superiors will have incentive to remain uninformed, and
“might systematically fail to acquire such knowledge”119 in order to avoid
liability. The practical result is that there will be less evidence of the
superior’s knowledge of wrongdoing, as the superior will ensure that he
or she is not apprised of such information.120 This would impose a higher
115
116
117
118
119
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“evidentiary burden” on the prosecutor “when the defendant is a civilian
supervisor.”121
Vetter’s second criticism is of Article 28(b)(ii); the “crimes concerned
activities” element. As noted above, he suggests that this could either be
interpreted a modification of the superior-subordinate relationship element
contained in the main paragraph of Article 28(b), or it could be interpreted
as requiring a “nexus between the criminal activity of the subordinate and
the subordinate’s activities that the superior can control.”122 His concern is
with the latter interpretation. If Article 28(b)(ii) requires a proof of a new
element, it would “give defence counsel an additional weapon” whereby
“counsel can vigorously advocate that the prosecutor must prove this new
element in its entirety.”123
To be fair, Vetter’s criticisms of the CR provision of the Rome Statute are
based largely on a comparison weighing the civilian standard against its
companion military provision in the Rome Statute.124 However, Vetter implies
that Article 28(b) is a regression from CR’s past state under customary
international law.125 Indeed, he notes particularly that the post-war precedents
are “persuasive authority” that CR applies to civilians, and that its customary
form is stronger than that in the Rome Statute.126 The question is, however,
what actually was the status quo from which the standard was weakened? In
this respect, Vetter cites the civilian standard against the Celebici decision, on
the basis that it best reflects the current state of customary law.127 Moreover,
his argument is also based on the post-war precedents “prior to Celebici.”128
This argument warrants reviewing the cases which have addressed the
question of CR and civilians. The following section uses these cases to
illustrate that Vetter’s argument is problematic. Vetter’s conclusions with
121
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respect to the comparison of the bifurcated ICC CR standards are not
challenged. Rather, it will be shown that precedents holding civilians liable
on the basis of CR are wildly inconsistent, and worse, unjust. Moreover,
the ICTY judgment in Kordic calls into question whether, in the absence
of a codified civilian standard, CR will ever be applied to civilians. As such,
despite its weaknesses, the ICC civilian CR standard improves on the existing
state of the law for the mere fact that it explicitly and unambiguously applies
to civilian superiors.

IV. INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
ON CR AND CIVILIANS

A. Hirota
At the Tokyo Trial, Cabinet minister Koki Hirota was charged on the basis
of CR with the mistreatment of prisoners and failure to ensure observance
of IHL.129 Hirota, a civilian, served as Japan’s Foreign Minister during
the infamous 1937 Rape of Nanking.130 At the time, Hirota had received
diplomatic reports of the atrocities, but relied on assurances from the War
Ministry that the soldiers would be reined in.131 Hirota persisted in relying
on the assurances, despite the fact these reports continued.132 On the Tokyo
Trial reasoning described above, 133 Hirota was found to have failed to create
a system to ensure the proper treatment of prisoners, and was negligent
in relying on assurances from the War Ministry.134 Holding that he should
have “insisted before the cabinet” that the atrocities end, the Tribunal
Pritchard & Zaide, supra note 83, “Indictment”, Group Three, Counts 54, 55.
Lippman, supra note 14 at 22.
131
Ibid. at 22-23.
132
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133
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134
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convicted Hirota on these counts and for crimes against peace.135 Hirota was
executed.136
The CR counts of the Hirota conviction do not accord with the fundamental
premise that CR arises where there is a legal duty created by the superior’s
power to actually control subordinates’ conduct. Hirota had no formal
authority over the Japanese army. At best, he might have had “influence”
over the military,137 perhaps through his position in Cabinet.138 Indeed,
Justice Röling would have acquitted Hirota on the basis that the accused
“certainly could not have prevented…atrocities.”139 Hirota in fact resigned
from Cabinet in 1938 following a dispute with the military, and Röling’s
view is thus that Hirota “was not in a position to change what happened.”140
The lack of control indicates that Hirota’s conviction, with regard to the
CR counts, is deeply problematic. The basis for imposing a legal duty and
commensurate CR rests on the superior’s ability to actually control the
conduct of his or her subordinates. In Hirota, however, individual criminal
liability of the most severe nature was imposed on the flimsy basis of
“influence”. The imposition of criminal liability for the acts of soldiers over
which a civilian superior exercises only an indirect influence seems contrary
to principles of justice. Finding Hirota guilty in the absence of any ability to
prevent or punish those who violated the laws of war calls into question the
basis upon which he could justly be held personally responsible.
The obverse to an overly-strict conception of CR is a dangerous potential
for injustice. Where superiors are charged with the gravest offences, and
under threat of severe punishment, on the basis that they failed to prevent
or punish the acts, it behoves prosecutors and judges to be wary that the
Vetter, ibid, at 126.
Ibid, at 126.
137
Lippman, supra note 14 at 23.
138
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139
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desire for punishment does not come at the expense of fairness and justice
for the accused. Hirota indicates that a codified standard of civilian CR can
only benefit the international community. The Rome Statute requirement
that “crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility
and control of the superior”141 might prevent recurrences of rulings such as
Hirota.
B. The Musema Case at the ICTR
Musema is another example of CR gone awry in the absence of a codified
civilian CR provision. The accused civilian was the manager of a tea factory in
Rwanda142 who was charged with offences, including genocide, both directly
and on the basis of CR.143 These charges arose from a series of killings and
rapes that Musema was alleged to have participated in and failed to prevent
and punish.144 The trial chamber found Musema guilty on the basis of both
participation and CR.145
The most problematic issue with this decision is the Trial Chamber’s finding
that Musema’s “influential power” over factory workers was sufficient to
establish liability under CR.”146 This was based on the finding that Musema
exercised “legal and financial control” over employees, “particularly through
his power to appoint and remove” employees from their jobs.147 This gave
him the power to “take reasonable measures to attempt to prevent or punish
the use of Tea Factory vehicles, uniforms, or other Tea Factory property”
in the commission of offences. This was sufficient to create “de jure and de
facto control” over employees.148 As Alexander Zahar points out, this finding
is extremely problematic:149
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This reasoning is misguided. It does not distinguish
Musema from any ordinary factory director. Yet it cannot
be that all business managers stand liable to be convicted
for international crimes perpetrated by their employees
for the reason only that they were linked to them through
commonplace ties of labour. The commander envisaged by
the Article 6(3) doctrine, in its classical (martial) form, was
connected to his or her troops not by a mere supervisory
link; he or she was at the core of a combat unit with powers
of life and death over defenceless subjects, whether these
were civilians in a combat zone or prisoners of war; and he
or she was sworn to abide by the laws of war.
Alfred Musema surely committed horrendous crimes. However, the Trial
Chamber’s application of CR to a tea factory manager is absurd. The ability
to dock pay or fire someone is in no way analogous to a commander’s power
to dispense military justice. Musema highlights the fact that in the absence
of an express civilian CR standard, inconsistent and problematic decisions
can result.
C. ICTY Cases – Celebici and Kordic
1. Celebici
The leading authority on the required elements of CR is Celebici. Celebici
provides the first decision of an international tribunal since WWII to address
the issue of CR. It thoroughly reviews its application to civilians. As such, it
is the “contemporary authority” on CR.150 Celebici is often cited as authority
that CR can be applied to civilians.
Celebici involved charges against four Bosnian men charged with murder,
torture, and other offences committed while they worked as guards and
commanders of a prison camp in the village of Celebici.151 Three of the
accused were charged on the basis of CR.152 Delic was deputy commander
150
151
152
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of the prison, without formal legal authority. Mucic also acted as de facto
commander. Delalic was a military commander with responsibility for
the prison-camp.153 All were charged with failing to prevent or punish the
mistreatment of prisoners.154
Celebici is most useful for its rendering of the essential elements of CR under
the ICTY Statute. Celebici held that CR required proof of three elements:155
1. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;
2. the superior knew or had reason to know that the
criminal act was about to be or had been committed;
and
3. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the
perpetrator thereof.
It is in respect to the superior-subordinate element that the question of
civilians arose in Celebici.
The Trial Chamber relied on post-war precedents such as Hirota to hold that
civilians could satisfy the superior-subordinate element.156 Formal command
was unnecessary; de facto command could satisfy the superior element.157
However, Celebici is extremely cautious in demarking when civilians would
satisfy this element. While noting that in cases like Hirota, CR had been
imposed on civilians on the basis of “powers of persuasion rather than formal
legal authority to order action to be taken,” the Trial Chamber cautioned
that “the fundamental considerations underlying the basis of [CR] must be
kept in mind.”158 In this regard the ICTY stated:159
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[CR] is ultimately predicated upon the power of the
superior to exercise this power so as to prevent and
repress the crimes committed by his subordinates, and
a failure by him to do in a diligent manner is sanctioned
by the imposition of individual criminal responsibility
in accordance with the doctrine. It follows that there is a
threshold at which persons cease to possess the necessary
powers of control over the actual perpetrators of offences
and, accordingly, cannot properly be considered “superiors”
within the meaning of Article 7(3) of the Statute. While the
Trial Chamber must at all times be alive to the realities of
any given situation and be prepared to pierce such veils of
formalism that may shield those individuals carrying the
greatest responsibility for heinous acts, great care must be
taken lest an injustice be committed in holding individuals
responsible for the acts of others in situations where the
link of control is absent or too remote.
Celebici accordingly required “effective control over the person committing
the underlying violations,” defined as the “material ability to prevent and
punish the commission of these offences.”160 The control exercised must
be to a degree analogous to that of military commanders.161 The ICTY was
obviously concerned about the injustice which can arise if CR is too loosely
applied, and Celebici certainly casts doubt on the correctness of Hirota.
In the result, only Mucic was convicted on the basis of CR.162 The ICTY did
not go so far as to refer to Mucic as a “civilian,” but they did note that he was
not formally appointed as a commander, having only de facto authority.163
This result might suggest that Celebici imposed CR on a civilian, in the sense
that Mucic had no de jure authority over the prison camp. Such a conclusion,
however, is not entirely evident. Mucic was certainly “less of a civilian than
a tea-factory director.”164 Indeed, the willingness to find that Mucic had de
160
161
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facto authority was partly based on the fact that the complex Yugoslavia
situation was such that “control and command structures” were “ambiguous
and ill-defined.”165 Thus, the ICTY may not have considered Mucic a civilian
at all, but rather an informal military commander in a new, improvised, and
dynamic control and command structure.
2. Kordic
Kordic concerned the prosecution of a Bosnian Croat civilian political leader
charged with offences arising from fighting between Bosnian Croats and
Muslims in central Bosnia.166 The indictment charged Kordic on the bases
including CR.167 The facts and holding of this decision are most clearly stated
in the ICTY’s acquittal on the CR charges:168
Dario Kordic was a civilian and a politician with tremendous
influence and power in Central Bosnia. He occupied an
important position in the leadership of the HZ H-B, but was
not in the top echelon, being answerable to Mate Boban.
While he played an important role in military matters, even
at times issuing orders, and exercising authority over HVO
forces, he was, and remained throughout the Indictment
period, a civilian, who was not part of the formal command
structure of the HVO.
These findings indicate that Kordic was a perfect case to apply the Celebici
standard to find a civilian liable on the basis of CR. Kordic had great influence
and power, and played an important role in military matters. Indeed, he
ordered attacks which were carried out. While not in formal command of
the Bosnian Croat forces, he certainly exercised de facto control akin to that
of a military commander. Simply put, he could have prevented or punished
international crimes.
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Nevertheless, Kordic was acquitted on the CR charges. Other than citing the
caution in Celebici, the decision gives little indication as to why Kordic did
not exercise de facto command. As the decision states:169
Although liability under Article 7(3) may attach to
civilians as well as military personnel, once it is established
that the requisite power to prevent or punish exists, the
Chamber holds that great care must be taken in assessing
the evidence to determine command responsibility in
respect of civilians, lest an injustice is done. In the first
place, it is established that substantial influence (such as
Kordic had), by itself, is not indicative of a sufficient degree
of control for liability under Article 7(3). Secondly, while
liability under Article 7(3) may attach not only to persons
in formal positions of command, but also to those who
are effectively in command of more informal structures,
the Chamber finds that Kordic lacked effective control,
which the Appeals Chamber in the Celebici case defined as
“a material ability to prevent or punish criminal conduct,
however that control is exercised”.
In sum, the Chamber finds that Kordic was neither a
commander nor a superior in respect of the HVO, since he
possessed neither the authority to prevent the crimes that
were committed, nor to punish the perpetrators of those
crimes, and as such, he is not liable under Article 7(3) of
the Statute.
These reasons are difficult to reconcile with the holding. The Trial Chamber
finds that Kordic exercised authority over the military and ordered the
commission of illegal acts, which were indeed carried out. And yet it
somehow concludes that Kordic lacked the ability to prevent the crimes.
Such reasoning strains credulity. It is difficult to imagine how someone who
orders the commission of a crime, knowing it will be carried out at their
behest, cannot also prevent that crime. Of course, the Trial Chamber could
169
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afford to neglect the CR charges, as they had already convicted Kordic for
direct liability. Nevertheless the Kordic decision obviously calls into question
whether a civilian would ever be held liable on the Celebici standard, tenuous
cases such as Musema notwithstanding.

V. CONCLUSION

The debate over the application of CR to civilian superiors stems from a
more fundamental tension, one common in the context of criminal justice in
Western democracies: balancing fairness and justice to the alleged offender
against the need to prevent and punish the most deplorable international
crimes. This paper has indicated that CR is one of relatively few means by
which the international community can hold civilian leaders individually
responsible for breaches of IHL. On this view, it is more unjust to allow
civilian leaders to dodge responsibility by exploiting a de jure, formalistic
distinction between military and civilian authority. This view certainly has
merit. As Vetter’s lucid critique indicates, the Rome Statute’s bifurcated CR
provision imposes lower responsibility for civilian superiors vis-à-vis military
commanders. From the perspective of the efficacy of prosecuting breaches
of international humanitarian law, this lower standard is problematic. It is
particularly so because the critique implicitly holds that CR has always been
applied to civilians in the past without issue or ill effects.
This paper, however, has shown that the application of CR to civilians is not
at all settled. Cases like Hirota and Musema illustrate the potential injustice
which can arise when CR, in the absence of a settled standard, is applied in an
unprincipled manner. The underlying justification for punishing superiors
for offences committed by subordinates is that the superior has both a duty
and the power to prevent such conduct. Where the superior fails to do so,
either intentionally or through criminal negligence, punishment becomes
both morally and legally justifiable. It is very likely the haphazard manner in
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which CR was applied in cases such as Hirota contributed to the development
of the cautious Celebici view – so starkly exemplified by Kordic – that CR
must be tightly controlled. International jurists are reticent to extend CR too
far, especially when tasked with applying a traditionally military doctrine to
civilians on the basis of unclear, inconsistent and sparse historical precedent,
and in the absence of a codified, clear civilian standard.
In this respect, Article 28 of the Rome Statute is not a stumble backwards
from past customary international law on CR, but a strong step forward.
While its civilian CR standard may not be as strict as some might have hoped
for, the Rome Statute nevertheless codifies a solid starting block for applying
CR to civilian superiors with consistency, principle, and justice.

